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FEDERAL COURTS, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

RE-EXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE FEDERAL COURTS:
AN INTRODUCTION
Anthony J. Bellia Jr.*
Legal scholars have debated intensely the role of customary international law in the American federal system. The debate involves serious questions surrounding the United States's constitutional
structure, foreign relations, and human rights. Despite an impressive
body of scholarship, the debate has stood at an impasse in recent
years, without either side garnering a consensus. This symposiumRe-examining Customary InternationalLaw and the Federal Courts-aspires
to help advance the debate over the status of customary international
law in the federal courts.
The symposium received thoughtful and constructive contributions from Professors Curtis A. Bradley, Bradford R. Clark, Andrew
Kent, Carlos M. Vizquez, and Ingrid Wuerth. The authors presented
early versions of their papers at the annual meeting of the Federal
Courts Section of the American Association of Law Schools in New
Orleans, Louisiana on January 7, 2010. The papers address the general status of customary international law in the federal system and,
more specifically, the scope and effect of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),
which confers jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear an important
category of cases involving customary international law.

I.

THE DEBATE OVER CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAw

For over a decade, two diametrically opposed positions have dominated debate over the role of customary international law in the fed* Professor of Law and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow, Notre Dame Law
School.
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eral system.' The so-called "modern" position holds that national and
state courts should enforce customary international law as supreme
federal law regardless of whether the political branches (Congress and
the President) have adopted it through constitutional lawmaking
processes.2 Adherents of this position contend that courts should recognize customary international law as a form of federal common law,
preemptive of state law and sufficient to establish federal "arising
under" jurisdiction in Article III courts.3 The "revisionist" position, by
contrast, holds that customary international law is supreme federal law
only to the extent that the political branches have properly incorporated it; otherwise, it may operate as state law if a state has incorporated it.4 Some scholars reject both the modern and revisionist
positions in favor of a third approach: that courts should treat customary international law not as state or federal law, but as a source of
nonbinding transnational law. 5
1 The following summary of this debate is taken in substance from Anthony J.
Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The FederalCommon Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1-5 (2009).
2 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
InternationalLaw, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 295, 295; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing:InternationalHuman Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 463, 472 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111
HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1825 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to ProfessorsBradley and Goldsmith, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV.
371, 371-72 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of OurLand: Customary InternationalLaw
as FederalLaw After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1997).
3 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
"[t] he law of nations forms an integral part of the common law, and ... became a
part of the common law of the United States upon the adoption of the Constitution"
and that "[f]ederal jurisdiction over cases involving international law is clear"
(emphasis omitted)). Proponents of the modern position argue that customary international law qualifies as "Law[ ] of the United States" for purposes of the Supremacy
and Arising Under Clauses. See Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559-60 (1984).
4 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 870
(1997); see also Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665, 670-73 (1986) ("[C]ustomary international law has not traditionally been applied by American courts, nor should it be.").
5 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 342-61
(2007) (recognizing that the law of nations is enforceable in federal courts as a rule of
decision if it "does not displace otherwise-constitutional state or federal law"); Ernest
A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary InternationalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365,
369-70 (2002) (arguing customary international law is neither state nor federal law,
but "general" law that "would remain available for both state and federal courts to
apply in appropriate cases as determined by traditional principles of the conflict of
laws"); see also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41
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Professor Bradford Clark and I have summarized the fundamental tension between the modem and revisionist positions:
Critics of the modern position maintain that it is in tension with
basic notions of American representative democracy because when
a federal court applies customary international law as federal common law, it is not applying law generated by U.S. lawmaking
processes. These critics contend that the modern position disregards the historical reality that before the Supreme Court decided
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins in 1938, customary international law

was not regarded as federal law, but as a species of nonpreemptive
"general law." Erie, they say, banished general law from federal
courts and established that state law applies except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.
In response, critics of the revisionist position argue that it fails
to account for the Constitution's assignment of foreign relations
authority to the federal government rather than the states. In their
view, the revisionist position contravenes the Constitution's basic
allocation of foreign affairs power by allowing states to determine
the force and effect of customary international law. In addition,
they contend that the revisionist position disregards a long line of
statements, stretching back to the founding, by federal judges and
public officials that the customary law of nations-today known as
"customary international law"-is "part of the law of the land." The
critics argue that these public actors necessarily understood the law
of nations to be preemptive of state law (and perhaps even federal
statutes) as well as sufficient to generate Article III arising under
jurisdiction. In light of the vast gap between these competing
claims and critiques, the debate over the role of customary international law in the American federal system has reached something of
a stalemate. 6
Professor Clark and I recently have argued that the law of nations
has occupied a different place in the American constitutional system
than adherents of the modem and revisionist positions have recognized.7 After the Constitution was ratified, judges and other public
officials debated a similar question to the one that dominates debates
over customary international law today: whether federal courts have
L. REV. 1205, 1251 (1988) (contending American courts cannot force the President to comply with international law); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
InternationalCases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 48-49 (1995) (analogizing customary interna-

VAND.

tional law to "the law of a foreign country," only applicable in "American courts in
appropriate cases").
6 Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 4-5 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
7 See generally id. at 1-93.
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power under Article III to adopt the law of nations-a species of general law-as part of a common law of the United States. Ultimately,
public debate moved past this question. After the Supreme Court
decided in 1812 that the constitutional structure precludes courts
from unilaterally recognizing and applying a federal municipal common law of crimes, the Court came to enforce certain principles of
the law of nations as a means of implementing the Constitution's allocation of foreign relations powers to the federal political branches. At
the Founding, if one nation violated another's "perfect rights" under
the law of nations, the offended nation had just cause to retaliate
through war. In the first decades following ratification, the Court
respected perfect rights of foreign sovereigns to ensure that any decision to commit the United States to war would rest with the political
branches, not with the judiciary or the states. In recovering this lost
context, Professor Clark and I identified an approach grounded in the
Constitution's allocation of powers that explains how important
aspects of the law of nations have interacted with the federal system in
significant cases throughout American history. This approach helps
alleviate the apparent tension between the Constitution's allocation of
foreign relations powers to the federal government (emphasized by
proponents of the modern position) and the Constitution's required
lawmaking procedures (stressed by proponents of the revisionist
position).
That said, Professor Clark and I did not attempt to work out all
the implications of our analysis for present-day interactions between
customary international law and the federal system. In the twentieth
century, customary international law underwent a transformation, recognizing violations-especially by a nation against its own citizensthat were unknown for most of U.S. history. Moreover, under customary international law today, violations generally do not give an
offended nation just cause for war. Finally, in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,8 the Supreme Court came to reject the idea of general law,
generating confusion about the status of customary international law
in federal and state courts. These developments (and others) pose
challenges for applying historical practice to contemporary interactions between customary international law and the federal system.
Three articles from this symposium seek to advance the debate
over the role of customary international law in the federal system. In
The PoliticalBranches and the Law of Nations, Professor Clark and I discuss the power of the political branches to depart from the law of
nations. We explain that the Supreme Court has long assumed,
8

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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expressly and implicitly, that the Constitution grants Congress and the
President-in some combination-discretion to depart from the law
of nations in the exercise of their assigned powers. Although we do
not attempt to provide a full account of the respective powers of the
political branches to depart from the law of nations, we offer a separation of powers rationale for why the Court has sometimes limited
executive power according to the law of nations while leaving Congress free to depart from such law.
In The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, Professor Andrew Kent examines Supreme Court decisions involving the
laws of war during the Civil War era. He attempts to recover forgotten
rules and theories surrounding the relationship between the Constitution and the laws of war. He details how certain theories rose to
prominence in public debate during the Civil War era-and ultimately to acceptance by the three branches of the U.S. government.
Professor Kent describes tensions between these materials and present-day Supreme Court practice.
Finally, in an article that was originally presented at this symposium but that will be published in Volume 86, Issue 4 of the Notre
Dame Law Review- Customary InternationalLaw as U.S. Law: A Critiqueof
the Intermediate Positions and Defense of the Modern Position-Professor
Carlos Vdzquez provides a systematic critique of the customary international law debate, concluding that the modern position is more
consistent with the constitutional structure, original meaning, and
pre- and post-Eriejudicial practice than the revisionist position. In so
doing, Professor Vdzquez generally endorses the allocation of powers
approach that Professor Clark and I have advanced, but argues that
we have not gone far enough in recognizing the substantial support
that it provides for the modern position.
II.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The ATS is one mechanism through which customary international law has provided rules of decision in federal courts. Accordingly, this symposium's re-examination of customary international law
and the federal courts appropriately includes analyses of the scope
and operation of this important statute.
The ATS, as originally enacted in 1789, provided "[t]hat the district courts . .. shall ... have cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
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nations or a treaty of the United States."9 The statute was rarely
invoked for almost two centuries. In 1980, lower federal courts began
using the ATS to allow foreign citizens to sue U.S. or other foreign
citizens for violations of modern customary international law.10
Courts and commentators have struggled to interpret the ATS in light
of changes in the scope and content of customary international law.
In 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain," the Supreme Court interpreted
the statute to leave the door "open to a narrow class of international
norms today,"1 2 stressing the need for 'judicial caution when considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the early statute."' 3 According to the Court,
"federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted."I 4
Several questions regarding the scope and effect of the ATS
remain after Sosa. One involves the state action requirement under
international law. Several ATS plaintiffs have brought suit against private corporations alleged to have participated in government abuses.
In State Action and Corporate Human Rights Liability, Professor Curtis
Bradley examines the state action requirement as a potential obstacle
to such suits. He argues that federal courts should not apply state
action doctrine developed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a domestic civil
rights statute, to ATS cases. Moreover, he contends that § 1983 jurisprudence, even if applied, does not support corporate aiding and
abetting liability in ATS cases.
Lower courts also have struggled after Sosa with the extent of secondary liability, the availability of punitive damages, and the necessity
of exhaustion, among other issues, in ATS cases. Under a binary
approach, international law would govern some of these issues and
federal common law would govern others. In The Alien Tort Statute
and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, Professor Ingrid Wuerth
argues that courts should reject a binary approach and instead understand federal common law to apply to all such aspects of ATS litiga9 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
10 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
11 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
12 Id. at 729.
13 Id. at 725.
14 Id. at 732. According to the Court, these paradigms consisted of "torts corresponding to Blackstone's three primary offenses [against the law of nations]: violation
of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Id. at 724;
see 4 WIulAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68-73.
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tion, including the substantive standard of liability. Under her
approach, some ATS issues would be governed by federal common law
that is closely tied to international law, while other issues would be
governed by federal common law divorced from international law.
Professor Wuerth contends that by understanding some form of federal common law to govern all such issues, courts would avoid difficult
choice of law questions, more effectively implement international
norms, and better fulfill congressional intent.

I am grateful to all participants in this symposium for their
thoughtful contributions and constructive efforts to advance the
debate over the place of customary international law in the American
federal system.
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